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Commodity exporters often adopt procyclical ﬁscal policies that
exacerbate macroeconomic volatility (Gavin and Perotti, 1997;
Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005). Increasingly, empirical
evidence suggests that the mismanagement of the commodity reve-
nues may be a primary culprit behind the volatility in commodity-
exporting countries (Adler and Sosa, 2014; Frankel et al., 2013).
Husain et al. (2008) ﬁnd that oil price changes affect the economic
cycle of oil exporters primarily through their impact on ﬁscal policy.1
However, stark differences exist across countries. For example, Chile,
with its explicit ﬁscal framework, has successfully reduced macro-
economic volatility to commodity price ﬂuctuations relative to
other Latin American economies (Medina, 2010). This evidence has
brought calls for the adoption of formal ﬁscal frameworks to manage
the commodity revenue volatility (Kumhof and Laxton, 2013; IMF,
2012; Frankel et al., 2013).
Although ﬁscal rules for oil-exporting economies (i.e. Norway) in-
clude explicit provisions to respond to cyclical conditions, there are cur-
rently no studies examining the performance and design of alternative
ﬁscal rules for oil-exporting countries. Nearly all of the current studies
on the short-run management of revenues via ﬁscal policy rules focusd Humanities Research Council
y price volatility is one of policy
ging economies. Others include
e Baunsgaard et al. (2012) and
e issues).
. This is an open access article underon the case ofmanaging copper revenues inmodels generally calibrated
for Chile (Kumhof and Laxton, 2013; Bi and Kumhof, 2011; Garcia et al.,
2011). It is not known whether the results for optimal ﬁscal policy for
non-oil commodity exporters generalize to oil exporters.
For example, the aforementioned studies assume that the com-
modity is not consumed in the consumption basket. This unique
feature of oil is known to have important consequences for con-
sumption dynamics (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009; Hamilton, 2008)
and the inﬂation-output trade-off for optimal monetary policy
(Natal, 2012). In particular, household consumption of durables is
observed to be responsive to real oil prices (Edelstein and Kilian,
2009). The failure to incorporate oil in consumption in formal
models can help explain why output in these models are not found
to be very responsive to real oil price changes, see for example the
discussion of Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2007).
Moreover, previous studies have assumed that demand driven price
movements are commodity speciﬁc (Kumhof and Laxton, 2013; Bi and
Kumhof, 2011) or commodity prices are exogenous (Garcia et al.,
2011). Evidence suggests that oil price movements are partially driven
by broad-based demand forces (Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Murphy,
2014; Juvenal and Petrella, 2015). A global model is necessary to distin-
guish between sources of oil price movements and capture these trans-
mission channels via exchange rates, the non-oil balance, and capital
accounts (Kilian et al., 2009; Bodenstein et al., 2012).
This paper evaluates alternative forms of ﬁscal policy rules for both
macroeconomic and welfare stabilization for oil-exporting economies.
The global market for crude oil is explicitly modeled in global dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with two-regions: a
small open oil exporter (SOE) and the rest of the world (ROW). The
model includes endogenous demand, supply, and trade of oil and non-
oil goods. Crude oil as an input into intermediate production and thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tinguish between oil supply and broad-based demand driven forces on
the oil price for the trade balance and the output-inﬂation trade-off.
Moreover, the model integrates both detailed formalizations of ﬁscal
andmonetary policy which is exploited to examine ﬁscal andmonetary
policy coordination.
Budget-balance rules with countercyclical responses to both the
non-oil tax gaps and oil royalty gaps are found to be the preferable to al-
ternative forms the ﬁscal policy rules to stabilize the macroeconomic
volatility andwelfare of oil-exporting countries. These rules clearly out-
perform ﬁscal rules that only target the debt-gap and are slightly more
advantageous to ﬁscal rules that only respond to the output gap.Macro-
economic stabilization is found to require more aggressive ﬁscal reac-
tion relative to welfare stabilization. The desirability of targeting of the
oil-royalties gap is due to the high correlation of the oil-royalties gap
with the pass-through of oil prices into headline inﬂation. This ﬁnding
is unique to this study as previous studies have abstracted from the di-
rect consumption of petroleum products (Kumhof and Laxton, 2013; Bi
and Kumhof, 2011; Garcia et al., 2011; Montoro, 2012).
In addition, the optimal design of ﬁscal rules differs for externally
driven demand and supply price movement due to each shocks unique
impact on the non-oil balance and the corresponding inﬂation-output
trade-off. The results are robust to alternative instruments satisfying
theﬁscal rule, butwith reduced efﬁciency from instruments that impact
potential output such as government investment and capital taxes.
Moreover, budget-balance rules with countercyclical responses to
both the non-oil tax gaps and oil royalty gaps are found to be robust
across a diversiﬁed set of oil-exporters, including advanced countries
such as Canada and Australia and OPEC oil specialists such as Saudi
Arabia.
Jointly optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy regimes are examined.
The use of ﬁscal policy rules is especially desirable for supply driven
price movements as they show success in being able to tackle the
inﬂation-output trade-off rife in oil-exporting countries. Optimal head-
line inﬂation targeting outperforms optimal core inﬂation targeting re-
gimes under a structural surplus rule. However, when both ﬁscal and
monetary rules are jointly optimized, both headline and core inﬂation
targeting can roughly achieve the samedegree ofmacroeconomic stabi-
lization. Even under optimal monetary policy, adopting a ﬁscal rule can
produce large reductions in macroeconomic volatility. For a ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime, macroeconomic volatility is three times higher
under the optimal ﬁscal rule compared to an optimized rule under an
inﬂation targeting regime.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the structure
and calibration of the model. Section 3 describes the results in three
parts. The ﬁrst part looks at the efﬁcient design of ﬁscal policy rules
for a benchmark oil exporter in the face of external oil-price shocks.
The second part examines how the design of such rules differs given al-
ternative structural characteristics of the oil exporter. Finally, joint coor-
dination of ﬁscal and the monetary policy framework are considered.
The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Model and calibration
This paper uses an open-economyNew-KeynesianDSGEmodel sim-
ilar to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The
model includes a detailed ﬁscal sector with non-Ricardian features to
speciﬁcally examine the interaction of ﬁscal and monetary policy prop-
agation mechanisms. In particular, the model is an extension of the
Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF) which has been
widely used at the International Monetary Fund. The theoretical
micro-foundations of the model are extensively described in Kumhof
et al. (2010), which serves as a detailed technical appendix to this
paper. A detailed examination of the properties of the GIMF model can
be found in Anderson et al. (2013). Since the models structure apart
from the oil sector speciﬁcation, policy rules, country structure, andcalibration, is identical to that described in Kumhof et al. (2010), this
section provides an overview of the model structure with focus on the
relevant aspects of the oil sector and ﬁscal policy.
The model is micro-founded with optimizing behavior of both
households and ﬁrms. There is intertemporal stock-ﬂow accounting in
the level of government debt, net foreign assets, human wealth, and
capital stocks. Keynesian properties are derived from frictions in the
form of real and nominal adjustment costs, and the presence of both
liquidity-constrained (LIQ) households. These Keynesian features pro-
vide non-neutrality in both spending- and revenue-based ﬁscal mea-
sures. They also capture the interaction of ﬁscal and monetary policies,
which makes the model particularly suitable to jointly analyze ﬁscal
and monetary policy.
Households pay distortionary taxes on labor income and consump-
tion spending, and a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. LIQ households
are perfectly borrowing constrained, consume all of their income in
every period, and have no access to ﬁnancial markets to smooth con-
sumption. Overlapping-generation households (OLG), as in Blanchard
(1985), are unconstrained and smooth their consumption. The presence
of OLG households means that public debt is counted as net wealth
since some of the associated tax liabilitieswill fall beyond their planning
horizon. Thus, a decrease in government debt today represents a de-
crease in OLG household wealth. Real returns are equilibrated globally
in the global savings and investment market by the global real interest
rate, and current accounts are endogenous. The SOE can borrow and
save at the global real interest rate. It is assumed that the sovereign
risk premium is not responsive to the level of net foreign assets.
The multi-country structure of GIMF captures the effects of interna-
tional trade spillovers. Bilateral trade ﬂows of intermediate goods and
ﬁnal consumption and investment goods are modeled explicitly along
with the relative prices between each region. Asset markets are incom-
plete, and the only assets traded internationally are nominal, non-
contingent one-period bonds denominated in the rest of the world cur-
rency. Government debt is domestically owned and can crowd out the
domestic holdings of net foreign assets. Firms are owned domestically
and pay lump-sum dividends on a share of proﬁts.
Production in GIMF is multi-layered. Capital, labor, and oil produce
intermediate tradable and non-tradable goods. Capital is supplied by
entrepreneurs with a procyclical ﬁnancial accelerator à la Bernanke
et al. (1999). This implies there are importance balance sheet effects
from ﬁrm default as well as Fisher deﬂation effects on debt since
bonds are deﬁned in nominal terms. The ﬁnancial accelerator helps to
match the co-movement of consumption and investment both domes-
tically and across economies (see for example, Beaton et al., 2014;
Anderson et al., 2013). Firms have ﬁnite planning horizons in accor-
dance with the preferences of their owners, the OLG households.
Firms pay capital income taxes to governments and wages and divi-
dends to households. Physical capital is sector-speciﬁc, but labor is mo-
bile across sectors. Neither labor nor physical capital is mobile across
regions, although trade in investment goods eases the restrictiveness
of this assumption.
Domestic and imported intermediate goods are combined to pro-
duce consumption and investment goods. A share of oil is consumed di-
rectly in the household's consumption basket. Thus, an increase in the
price of oil drives up the cost of production as well as the cost of the
ﬁnal consumption basket. The demand for oil, in production as well as
in the consumption basket, is highly inelastic.
The oil sector is characterized by a low price elasticity of supply. For
analytical tractability oil supply is modeled by ﬂow endowments, Xtexog,
which grows at growth rate, Ttnt, and can be stored and drawn from a
stockpile, Ot, in each period for each country. The cost of storage is
given by:
GOt ¼
ϕO
2 Ttntð ÞO
2
t−κOOt; ð1Þ
475S. Snudden / Economic Modelling 59 (2016) 473–483where GtO is the cost of storage, Tt is the productivity growth rate, nt is
the population growth rate, ϕO and κO are parameters determining the
cost of storage. The raw material producer's optimization problem is
given by:
max
Otþsf g∞s¼0
Et∑
∞
s¼1Rt;sP
X
tþs X
exog
tþs − Otþs−Otþs−1ð Þ−GOtþs
 
; ð2Þ
where PtX is the nominal market price of crude oil, and Rt is the steady-
state real interest rate. The ﬁrst order condition is:
1−κO þ ϕOOˇt ¼ Et θ
rˇt p
X
tþ1
pXt
;
ð3Þ
where,θ, is the probability of survival of OLG agents,Oˇt is real oil supply
where Oˇt ¼ Ot=Ttnt , and rˇt is the real interest rate payable by the pri-
vate sector. The real supply of crude oil, Xˇ supt ; is given by:
Xˇ
sup
t ;¼ Xˇ
exog
t − Oˇt−
Oˇt−1
gn
 !
−GˇtO; ð4Þ
The ﬂow endowment of oil, Xˇexogt ; is subject to shocks to domestic
supply, etX. The size of the endowment has a small positive elasticity,
εX, to the ten-year, backward-looking moving average of the oil price
with a ﬁve-year lag:
log Xˇexogt Þ ¼ ρX log Xˇexogt−1 Þ þ log Xexog
 
þ εX log pxavet−5=px
 þ eXt ð5Þ
where ρX is the AR(1) coefﬁcient of shock persistence, and px is the
steady-state price of crude oil. Oil supply, εX, is inelastic and takes
10 years to fully effect the ﬂow endowment of oil supply.
The total demand of crude oil in each country is given byXˇdemt , and is
the sum of the demand for oil in production in the tradable goods, XˇTt ,
non-tradables goods, XˇNt , and via direct household consumption, XˇCt :
Xˇdemt ¼ XˇTt þ XˇNt þ XˇCt ð6Þ
The normalized value of each country's net crude oil exports is given
by:
Xˇxt ¼ pxt Xˇ supt −Xˇdemt Þ

ð7Þ
The supply of crude oil is sold into a globalmarket which is perfectly
competitaive with a single global market price of crude oil. Oil rents are
the difference between the extraction cost and the market price of oil
and may accrue to households, the government, or foreign households.
A constant share of normalized steady-state crude oil revenue, sfx, is paid
to domestic OLG agents as a dividend, dˇXt , given by:
dˇXt ¼ sxdpˇXt Xˇ supt : ð8Þ
The remaining proﬁts, (1− sdx) pXt X
ˇ sup
t , are distributed by constant
share, sfx, via dividends to the foreign OLG agents in the ROW, f
ˇx
t , and
to payments to the government gˇxt , where:
f ˇxt ¼ sxf pXt Xˇ supt −dˇ
X
t Þ; and

ð9Þ
gˇxt ¼ pXt Xˇ supt −dˇ
X
t− f
ˇx
t ð10ÞBy international arbritrage the domestic price of oil is given by:
pXt; j ¼ pXt et ð11Þ
where et is the nominal bilaterial exhange rate against the ROW.
Similarly, the dividends received by the rest of the world for ownership
of the SOE oil production are given by:
dˇxt;ROW ¼
f ˇxt;SOE
et
: ð12Þ
Themarket-clearing condition for the crude oilmarketworldwide is
given by:
∑Nj¼1 X
ˇ sup jð Þ
t −X
ˇdem jð Þ
t Þ ¼ 0:

ð13Þ
2.1. The ﬁscal rule
The ﬁscal authority employs a generalized budget-balance rule. The
formalization encompasses a range of rules, including the standard
targeting rules often considered in the literature (see for example Guo
and Lansing, 1998; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007) as well as the com-
modity and non-commodity tax revenue gaps that have been more re-
cently proposed for commodity exporters (Kumhof and Laxton, 2013; Bi
and Kumhof, 2011; Garcia et al., 2011). The ﬁscal rule is summarized as
follows:
gsratt ¼ gsrattar þ dtax
τt−τss
gdpt
 
þ doil τot−τoss
gdpt
 
þ ddebt bt
gdpt
−b
rat
 
þ dgdp gdpt
gdpss
 
; ð14Þ
where gstrat is the overall ﬁscal surplus-to-GDP ratio, gstarrat is the overall
ﬁscal surplus-to-GDP ratio target, τt and τot are the level of non-oil
and oil revenues, and τss and τoss are the steady-state level of non-oil
and oil revenue, respectively. Potential non-oil tax revenue is deﬁned
as the sum of steady-state consumption, labor income, and capital in-
come taxes multiplied by their respective tax bases. bt is the nominal
level of net savings of the sovereign authorities, with gdpt and gdpss
the level of real GDP at time t and in steady state, and b
rat
is the
steady-state net savings to GDP ratio.
The rule has two main functions. The ﬁrst is to stabilize the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio to its long-run target which is achieved by cen-
tering on the overall government surplus-to-GDP ratio, gstarrat, and
ensures dynamic stability. By targeting the overall deﬁcit, the long-run
target is inclusive of the oil revenues and tax income, similar to the
rule employed in Chile.
The secondmain function of the ﬁscal rule is to respond to the busi-
ness cycle. Coefﬁcients, dtax, doil ,ddebt, and dgdp determine the respon-
siveness of the overall ﬁscal balance to the non-oil tax revenue gap,
the oil-revenue gap, the debt to GDP ratio and the output gap, respec-
tively. In practice, this represents a continuum of rules, of which there
are three main categories.
• A balanced budget rule (BBR): A calibration of dtax=doil=ddebt=
dgdp=0, denotes a balanced budget rule. Under such a rule, the gov-
ernment budget is balanced in every period, so changes in oil and
tax revenues are distributed immediately to households through
changes in the ﬁscal instrument, either via taxes, direct transfers or
spending. This rule is procyclical by design since the government
must spend changes in oil and non-oil revenue.
• A structural-surplus rule (SSR): A calibration of dtax=doil=1 (and
ddebt=dgdp=0) denotes a structural-surplus rule. Under this rule,
changes in oil and tax revenues are saved. This rule minimizes
changes in tax rates or spending consistent with traditional
476 S. Snudden / Economic Modelling 59 (2016) 473–483prescriptions of optimal ﬁscal policy under Ricardian equivalence
(Barro, 1979).2
• A countercyclical rule (CCR): A calibration of dtax and doil greater
than one and/or dgdp less than zero denotes a countercyclical rule.
Under this rule, the ﬁscal authority more than saves changes in
oil and tax revenues. This rule implies active countercyclicality, in-
creasing (reducing) the structural balance during periods of strong
(weak) oil prices and/or economic activity.
Any combination of ﬁscal instruments can adjust to satisfy the ﬁscal
rule. Speciﬁcally, in eachperiod, theﬁscal authority determines the level
of tax rates or spending to achieve the deﬁcit targeted. In this paper, the
baseline ﬁscal instrument that adjusts to satisfy the ﬁscal rule is the
labor income tax. The labor income tax rate is distortionary, and broadly
corresponds to payroll taxes and personal income taxes. All other seven
ﬁscal instruments are examined sequentially.
Coefﬁcients in theﬁscal rule are jointly optimized, so theﬁscal policy
stance can be interpreted simultaneously by the coefﬁcients as well as
the movement in the ﬁscal balance. In presenting the results, both the
coefﬁcients values and the difference between the overall ﬁscal balance
of the efﬁcient ﬁscal policy rule and the SSR as a percent of GDP are re-
ported. Although previous research has emphasised the optimal rules
relative to the BBR, here the ﬁscal policy stance is interpreted as the dif-
ference between the overall deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio of the optimal rule rel-
ative to the SSR. This is done since the inappropriateness of the BBR is
well established whereas the desirability of explicitly countercyclical
rules relative to acyclical rules is less established.
Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in the adop-
tion of rules-based ﬁscal policy (Céspedes and Velasco, 2014; IMF,
2009; and Schaechter et al., 2012). In practice, ﬁscal policy behavior in
a number of commodity exporters has been broadly inﬂuenced by
rules of this kind. Chile follows a structural-surplus rule, which allows
for the presence of automatic stabilizers (dtaxN1). Norway's rule targets
a structural non-oil balance (doil=1) and also allows for countercyclical
responses over the business cycle (dtaxN1) or (dgdpb0).
2.2. Monetary policy rule
In the benchmark results, the central bank credibly operates an inﬂa-
tion targeting regime with a Taylor-type interest rate reaction function.
The policy rate, it, responds to the three-quarter-ahead gap between
projected core inﬂation, πt, and target inﬂation, πt, to achieve a stable
target rate of inﬂation. The target rate is assumed to be 2% in both the
SOE and the rest of the world regions. The monetary policy function is
deﬁned as follows:
1þ it ¼ Et 1þ it−1ð Þδt 1þ reqt
 
1þ πtð Þ
 1−δt 1þ πt
1þ πt
  1−δtð Þδπ
; ð15Þ
where ð1þ reqt Þð1þ πtÞ is the gross nominal interest rate. The equilib-
rium real world interest rate rteq is a geometric moving average of the
risk-adjusted global real equilibrium interest rate. The coefﬁcient on
the gap of projected core inﬂation and target inﬂation, δπ , is calibrated
to 1.5, with a lag coefﬁcient, δt, of 0.3.
2.3. Calibration
The strength of the model is its ability to replicate the key transmis-
sion mechanisms for a small-open commodity exporter. The baseline
calibration is the average of 35 small, open, developing oil-exporting2 The overall ﬁscal balance is targeted, so the instrument satisfying the rule will still re-
spond to changes in interest service costs.countries where oil exports represent over 10% of total exports, the
same sample reported in Duttagupta et al. (2012). Later in the paper,
sensitivity analysis is conducted around the baseline calibration. A com-
plete catalogue of the calibration is provided in the appendix.
The national accounts are calibrated to roughly match recent years
from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. Net government
debt ratio, private consumption and investment as well as exports and
imports are calibrated to the average in the sample. The SOE is normal-
ized to 1% of global real GDP. Net oil exports-to-GDP are calibrated to
18% of GDP. The share of oil consumed domestically is 6.5% of GDP.
This represents the 4% of the consumption basket of households with
the remainder used as an input into intermediate goods production.
The SOE constitutes a small share of total global oil demand, which im-
plies that domestic demand has little effect on the real global price of oil.
The calibration of the structural parameters relies heavily on previ-
ous research modeling the transmission of shocks to the oil market for
SOEs in GIMF. The calibration of the trade elasticities, nominal and real
rigidities, and core structural parameters are taken from these studies.
The share of liquidity-constrained agents in the SOE is calibrated to
50% of households consistent with Anderson et al. (2013) and Kumhof
and Laxton (2013). This implies a moderate degree of responsiveness
of aggregate consumption with respect to the total income of
households.
The initial calibration of the SOE assumes that (i) oil production is
owned almost wholly by the domestic government, which receives
75% of the associated rent (through “oil revenues”) and the remaining
25% is distributed to OLG households; (ii) oil constitutes a large share
of overall production, 19% of GDP, and 45% of exports; and (iii) there
is no foreign ownership in domestic oil production. In practice, this is
more representative of countries such as Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Syria, and Venezuela. These assumptions are sys-
tematically relaxed in the section on alternative structural characteris-
tics to examine the implication to the baseline ﬁndings.
The resource cost of oil production is 40% of the value of oil pro-
duced. The short-run price elasticity of oil demand is −0.08 within
the range, −0.07 to −0.2, of median short-run elasticities after the
1990′s estimated by Baumeister and Peersman (2013). The long-run
price elasticity of oil demand is−0.15 due to the cessation of the real
oil rigidities in the long run and driven by the structure of oil market
and the elasticity of substitution in production and demand. The
short-run price elasticity of oil supply in the model is b0.01, consistent
with the view that it is close to zero (Bodenstein et al., 2012; Kilian,
2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2014). The endowment of oil has a low
long-run price elasticity of supply, 0.03, and responds fully only with a
ten-year lag, well within the short-run median elasticity range of 0 to
0.1 after the 1990′s found by Baumeister and Peersman (2013). A per-
manent increase in total factor productivity in the ROWwhich increases
real GDP of the global economy by 1%, results in a rise in the global real
price of crude oil by 14% in the short run but only by 10% in the long run,
consistent with the short run estimates using real GDP following Kilian
(2009).
2.4. Methodology
The ﬁscal rule is optimized for a demand and supply driven tempo-
rary oil price ﬂuctuation in a non-stochastic environment. The advan-
tage of this approach is that we do not have to take a stand on the
relative incidence of the shocks. Hence, the optimal rule will not be
the optimal rule on average, but the optimal rule conditional on the
source of the oil price movement. We consider two policy objectives.
The ﬁrst policy objective minimizes macroeconomic volatility which is
deﬁned as a weighted average of the standard deviation of the output
gap and headline inﬂation from its target:
LossFunction ¼ sd πgapð Þ þ λYsd gdpgap
  ð16Þ
Effects on the SOE
Effects on the Row
(horizontal-axis in years)
Fig. 1. Temporary reduction in oil supply in the rest of the world.
477S. Snudden / Economic Modelling 59 (2016) 473–483where sd(πgap) is the standard deviation of actual headline inﬂation
from the 2% inﬂation target, and sd(gdpgap) is the standard deviation
of real GDP from the steady-state level. The baseline focus on equal sta-
bilization of the headline inﬂation and the output gap, λY calibrated to
one, is consistentwith the broad objective of business cycle stabilization
for policy makers.
In addition, the policy objective to reduce the volatility of household
welfare is considered. Welfare is computed by evaluating the net pres-
ent value of the utility across generations weighted by the share ofOLG and LIQ agents. The model is simulated using a Newton-Raphson
stacked-time algorithm to solve for the exact nonlinear solution as in
Juillard et al. (1998).
Welfare0 ¼ E0∑
∞
t¼0
βt
t 1−αLIQ
 
UOLG;t þ αLIQULIQ;t
 	 ð16Þ
The optimal parameterizations are searched across the alternative
forms of ﬁscal rules such that the loss functions do not exhibit
478 S. Snudden / Economic Modelling 59 (2016) 473–483improvement beyond six digits. Rules that target the SSR and the struc-
tural non-oil balance are also reported as bases of comparison.
3. Results
The analysis considers the optimal design of ﬁscal policy rules given
two sources of temporary oil price ﬂuctuations: an external demand-Effects on t
Effects on t
(horizontal-axi
Fig. 2. Temporary increase in liqudriven oil price increase and an external supply-driven oil price in-
crease. In both scenarios, the shocks are calibrated so that they result
in a 20 percent increase in the price of oil that lasts for 3 years. This is
consistent with empirical ﬁndings of the averagemagnitude and persis-
tence of oil priceﬂuctuations in Duttagupta et al. (2012). Also consistent
with those ﬁndings, the two sources of ﬂuctuations have different ef-
fects on the SOE.he SOE
he Row
s in years)
idity in the rest of the world.
3 The use of public absorption to satisfy the ﬁscal rule will depend on the goods pur-
chased and their complimentarywith private consumption and capital. InGIMF, public ab-
sorption does not directly affect the utility of households or productivity of capital,
whereas public investment increases the productivity of public capital.
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3.1.1. External supply-driven oil price increase
Under this scenario, a temporary decline in the external supply of oil
in theROW, via a fall in eROW ,tX , increases the real price of oil by 20% in the
ﬁrst year, gradually returning over the next two years, as shown in
Fig. 1. As the ROW's GDP declines, so does the real external demand
for all goods exported by the SOE. However, the fall in external demand
is offset by the increase in the value of the SOE's oil exports, thereby im-
proving the trade balance. Despite the increase in headline inﬂation
from higher oil prices, depressed global demand moderates the real
price of ﬁnal goods.
3.1.2. External demand-driven oil price increase
Under this scenario, a temporary increase in liquidity in the rest of
theworld boosts global demand for all goods, as shown in Fig. 2. The in-
crease in foreign liquidity is generated by an exogenous temporary re-
duction in the domestic risk premium which is deﬁned by spread
between the nominal economy-wide rate and the monetary policy
rate. This is a persistent decline in ξROW,tb as described in Kumhof et al.
(2010). As the cost of borrowing declines, credit expands as agents bor-
row to ﬁnance a boom in consumption and investment. There is a fall in
net savings, and the real exchange rate depreciates in theROW. Adown-
turn follows the boom as agents deleverage and increase their savings
back to initial levels. The higher demand drives up the real price of oil
by about 20% in the ﬁrst three years, after which oil prices decline and
experience a boom-bust cycle. Contrary to a supply-driven oil-price
shock, the global demand boom increases the demand and prices of all
of the SOE's exports. Overall, the SOE experiences higher inﬂation and
output volatility than under a case of a relative price increase in oil
from a reduction in external oil supply.
Previous work looking at external demand driven commodity price
movements focuses on commodity-speciﬁc demand shocks (for exam-
ple, Kumhof and Laxton, 2013). This increases the demand only for
the primary commodity and mainly results in a relative price shock. In
contrast, this paper considers a broad-based external demand shock
consistent with the identiﬁcation of oil demand in Baumeister and
Peersman (2013); Bodenstein et al. (2012), and Kilian and Murphy
(2014). This is important since broad-based external demand-driven
oil price movements increase the demand for non-oil goods as well as
oil, resulting in alternative implications on the non-oil trade balance
and relative prices.
Oil-speciﬁc demand driven by ﬁnancial speculation has been found
to contribute to historical oil price volatility (Kilian and Murphy, 2014;
Beidas-Stromand Pescatori, 2014). Speculative demand shocks are tem-
porary relative price shocks and hence the macroeconomic effects are
very similar to temporary oil supply shocks. Hence, the qualitative re-
sults for ﬁscal rules to oil market ﬁnancial speculation shocks are ex-
pected to be consistent with the results for the temporary oil supply
shocks.
3.1.3. Optimal ﬁscal rules
For both the external supply- and demand-driven oil-price shocks, a
countercyclical response to thenon-oil revenues gaps constitutes the ef-
ﬁcient ﬁscal policy response. As shown in Table 1, an optimal budget-
balance tax gaps rule with countercyclical positions on the tax gaps
achieves the lowest degree of macroeconomic volatility relative to
targeting the debt or output gap. Only when the coefﬁcients on the
tax, debt, or output gaps are jointly optimized do the optimal rules
imply a non-zero weighting on the debt or output gap. Weights on the
debt gap can be combined with the tax-gap ﬁscal rules to reduce debt
volatility but provide very little additional improvement in output
volatility.
Targeting the non-oil structural balance and optimally responding to
cyclical non-oil tax revenues come very close to matching the optimal
design of ﬁscal policy rules for most cases. However, modest gains inperformance can be made by allowing for a countercyclical response
to the oil royalties gap due to its close correlation with inﬂation,
which helps stabilize inﬂation and real consumption. The desirability
of targeting of the oil-royalties gap is due to the high correlation of the
oil-royalties gap with the pass-through of oil prices into headline inﬂa-
tion. This ﬁnding is unique to this study as previous studies have ab-
stracted from the direct consumption of petroleum products (Kumhof
and Laxton, 2013; Bi and Kumhof, 2011; Garcia et al., 2011; Montoro,
2012).
Girouard and André (2005) ﬁnd that OECD countries respond coun-
tercyclically to the business cycle with an elasticity of the ﬁscal balance
with respect to output of around−0.33. Approximately 80% of this elas-
ticity constitutes the savings of the cyclical tax revenues, consistentwith
the SSR rule. The remaining response of the ﬁscal balance constitutes
automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance. The optimal
elasticities found in this paper are−0.41 and−0.53 for supply and de-
mand shocks respectively. This is onlymoderatelymore aggressive than
those currently used in OECD countries.
3.1.4. Welfare analysis
The objective of welfare stabilization is consistent with that of mac-
roeconomic stabilization, except for a few key differences. As shown in
Table 2, optimally responding to the tax-revenues gaps can achievewel-
fare gains with less ﬁscal instrument volatility than debt gap rules.
Targeting the GDP gap fares similarly well in the face of a supply driven
increase in the price of oil. In contrast, for demand driven changes in the
price of oil, targeting the GDP gap can achieve the same welfare gains
and reduce instrument volatility. The main difference is that the tax-
gap evokes more movement in the ﬁscal instrument in the ﬁrst period
which is penalized quadratically.
For both the optimal tax-gap rules and GDP gap rule, welfare stabili-
zation requires less volatility of theﬁscal instruments than that required
for optimal macroeconomic stabilization. This suggests that focusing
solely on macroeconomic stabilization relative to welfare stabilization
requires more aggressive policy action. However, solely focusing on
welfare is precarious due to the absence of the extensive margin of
labor. An increase in labor, although it could be due a reduction in un-
employment, is always counted as a disutility. The remainder of the
analysis focuses primarily on the objective of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion but addresses implications for the welfare criterion when qualita-
tively different.
The optimal policy implies it is optimal for the ﬁscal instrument
(labor income tax) to be volatile. This contrasts to Ricardian frameworks
that prescribes tax rate smoothing (Barro, 1979). The majority of the
gains from the welfare criterion are due to the reduction in volatility
of the welfare of LIQ households. This is consistent with the ﬁnding
that the role of the authority is primarily to smooth the consumption
of LIQ households due to their failure to have access to ﬁnancing to
smooth their own consumption, consistent with the ﬁndings for opti-
mal ﬁscal policy in non-oil commodity exporting countries by Bi and
Kumhof (2011). Using the welfare criterion LIQ households are unam-
biguously better off under the optimal rules, whereas OLG households
may be worse off, consistent with the ﬁndings for optimal monetary
policy by Natal (2012).
3.1.5. Instrument choice
The desirability of budget-balance tax-gap rules is robust to several
instruments satisfying the ﬁscal rule. As shown in Table 3, there is re-
duced efﬁciency from instruments that impact potential output such
as government investment and capital taxes.3 These distortionary in-
struments impact the productivity of private capital and induce
Table 1
Optimal ﬁscal rules by source of oil price ﬂuctuations.a
doil dtax d⁎b (Opt.− SSR) / GDPc Loss function SSR Loss function optimal
Temporary reduction in oil supply
Budget-balance tax-gap rule 102 5 × 103 – −0.51 0.080 0.045
Targeting the non-oil balance 1 107 – −0.23 0.080 0.050
Structural Surplus Rule with Debt Gap 1 1 −0.062 −0.17 0.080 0.059
Joint tax- and debt-gaps 102 5 × 103 −1.10 −0.51 0.080 0.045
Structural surplus rule with GDP gap 1 1 −0.41 −0.45 0.080 0.054
Temporary increase in oil demand
Budget-balance tax-gap rule −104 106 – −0.59 0.127 0.078
Targeting the non-oil balance 1 108 – −0.73 0.127 0.080
Structural surplus rule with debt gap 1 1 −0.060 −0.17 0.127 0.107
Joint tax- and debt-gaps −50 5 × 103 −0.90 −0.59 0.127 0.078
Structural surplus rule with GDP gap 1 1 −0.53 −0.33 0.127 0.108
a The labor income tax is assumed to satisfy the ﬁscal rules for this table and Table 2.
b Other optimized coefﬁcients: ddebt for efﬁcient debt adjustment, dgdp for output gap targeting.
c This measure is the difference of the overall deﬁcit between the optimal ﬁscal policy rule and the SSR as a percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year proceeding the shock.
Table 2
Optimal ﬁscal rules for welfare stabilization.
doil dtax d⁎a s.d. of instr.
Temporary reduction in oil supply
Budget-balance tax-gap rule 3 350 – 0.10
Targeting the non-oil balance 1 550 – 0.10
Structural surplus rule with debt gap 1 1 −0.074 0.49
Structural surplus rule with GDP gap 1 1 −0.26 0.13
Temporary increase in oil demand
Budget-balance tax-gap rule 2 50 – 0.37
Targeting the non-oil balance 1 65 – 0.29
Structural surplus rule with debt gap 1 1 −0.071 0.54
Structural surplus rule with GDP gap 1 1 −0.35 0.10
a Other optimized coefﬁcients: ddebt for efﬁcient debt adjustment, dgdp for output gap
targeting.
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capital taxes has been also noted by Guo and Lansing (2002). The unde-
sirability of capital taxes for formal ﬁscal frameworks has been noted
before by Kumhof and Laxton (2013), but noting the undesirability of
government investment is novel to this study.
In practice, the most desirable instruments achieve the desired im-
pact on output and inﬂationwith the smallest possible volatility in ﬁscal
instruments. Table 4 summarizes the two year ﬁscal multipliers in the
model. Public absorption and transfers to LIQ households have the larg-
est impact on output and inﬂation and are able to achieve a high degree
of stabilization without very much volatility in the ﬁscal instrument.
This is conﬁrmed by the optimal policy found in Table 3 as both public
absorption and transfers produce the largest gains of the optimized
rules with the least ﬁscal volatility. The qualitative desirability of ﬁscal
rules is consistent across the choice of instrument so are omitted for
simpliﬁcation in following expositions.
3.1.6. Inﬂation and output volatility tradeoff
When oil price volatility is supply-driven, output falls quickly once
oil revenues are removed, so further reductions in inﬂation volatility
come at the expense of additional output losses. In contrast, for the
case of external demand-driven volatility, since output is increasing
due to the improvement in the non-oil balance, additional reductions
in inﬂation can be achieved with less risk of output falling. This makes
the situation for oil exporters unique relative to non-oil primary com-
modity exporters, because they face additional volatility in headline in-
ﬂation due to oil consumption by households.Models that abstract from
the consumption of petroleum products fail to capture this important
transmission channel for oil exporters.
The inﬂation-output trade-off for oil exporters for optimal cyclical
ﬁscal policy parallels the ﬁnding in the monetary policy literature. In
particular, Coletti et al. (2012)ﬁnd that the efﬁcient response of both in-
ﬂation and price-level targeting to external supply driven oil price
movements are muted due to the inability of the small open economy
to directly affect oil prices and hence headline inﬂation. In an effort to
reduce inﬂation volatility, an aggressive policy can cause large ﬂuctua-
tions in output. This is when ﬁscal policy can provide more ﬂexibility
to tackle the inﬂation-output trade-off. This is especially true when
one considers that ﬁscal policy has a larger selection of policy instru-
ments with an array of output and inﬂation multipliers.
If oil is not consumed directly in the consumption basket, the opti-
mal ﬁscal policy for an external oil supply shock is to respond less to
the oil revenues' gap, as shown in Table 5. In such a case, the ﬁscal au-
thority has less inﬂation volatility and can respond to the inﬂation vol-
atility without sacriﬁcing output volatility. When oil is not consumed
in the consumption basket of households the ﬁnding mirror studies
who examine optimal ﬁscal policy to relative non-oil commodity price
movements. These studies ﬁnd that it is not desirable to respondcountercyclically to the commodity-revenues gap. The desirability of
targeting of the oil-royalties gap when then oil is consumed in the con-
sumption basket suggests that the efﬁcient size of the countercyclical
ﬁscal response for the case of an external supply shock increases with
the share of the commodity in the consumption basket.
3.2. Implications under alternative structural characteristics
This section considers structural characteristics that differ across oil
exporters and examines how this affects the design of the efﬁcientﬁscal
rule. In particular, four characteristics are considered: (i) when oil is
largely domestically privately owned; (ii) when oil constitutes a differ-
ent share of overall production; (iii) when there is a high degree of for-
eign ownership of production; and (iv)when there are different non-oil
tax bases. Fiscal rules that respond to both the oil-royalties and non-oil
tax revenues gap outperform ﬁscal policy rules that target the non-oil
structural balance for all cases so focus is placed on the complete
budget-balance tax-gap rules in exposition. The result suggests that
use of cyclical ﬁscal policy rules is desirable for all types of oil exporters.
3.2.1. Private or public ownership
Efﬁcient ﬁscal policy responds more to the tax-revenue gaps when
faced with external oil-price movements in an economy where oil is
produced and rents accrue to private companies. Table 5 reports the
case of low public ownership, where the ﬁscal authority only collects
10% of the oil rents, relative to the 75% in the baseline. This more closely
aligns to oil-exporting countries such as Australia or Canada.
There are two important considerations with a high share of private
ownership. First, if the majority of oil revenues go to OLG agents, they
optimally save some of the cyclical revenue. In this case, output is im-
plicitly less volatile. Second, oil revenues collected by theﬁscal authority
are smaller, so a given coefﬁcient in the ﬁscal rule implies less change of
Table 3
Optimal ﬁscal rules by instrument choice.
doil dtax (Opt.− SSR) / GDPa Loss function SSR Loss function optimal
Temporary reduction in oil supply
Labor income tax 102 5 × 103 −0.51 0.080 0.045
General transfers 102 5 × 103 −0.48 0.064 0.043
Public absorption 0 5 × 103 −0.16 0.050 0.038
Public investment 5 × 104 5 × 106 −0.22 0.128 0.046
Temporary increase in oil demand
Labor income tax −104 106 −0.59 0.127 0.078
General transfers 104 106 −0.85 0.122 0.078
Public absorption 102 5 × 103 −0.52 0.123 0.069
Public investment 102 5 × 103 −0.39 0.202 0.076
a This measure is the difference of the overall deﬁcit between the optimal ﬁscal policy rule and the SSR as a percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year proceeding the shock.
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deﬁcit is smaller for the supply driven oil pricemovements. Once again,
attempts to further reduce inﬂation volatility must comewith addition-
al output losses. In contrast, for a demand shock, the ﬁscal responsive-
ness increases as there is more non-oil balance movement and the
inﬂation and output gaps are more aligned.
The case of private ownership considered above still assumes that
LIQ households do not directly receive oil rents, consistent with the in-
terpretation that these households are the poorest and do not own pro-
ductive capital. If LIQ agents were to accrue oil rents the ﬁscal authority
would still accrue less rents than the baseline but would have to deal
with the additional volatility that would be present since the oil rents
would be immediately spent by LIQ household's which would further
exacerbate macro volatility.
3.2.2. Intensity of oil in output/exports
The desired degree of countercyclicality to tax revenues is decreas-
ing in the share of oil production in the overall economy and exports.
Table 5 shows the optimized ﬁscal rules when the SOE is highly depen-
dent on oil production and has oil exports as a percent of total exports at
90%. This reﬂects many OPEC countries and other oil-intensive econo-
mies including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen. For the demand driven oil price changes, the non-oil balance
contributes a smaller share to overall demand ﬂuctuations. Merely re-
moving ﬂuctuations in income driven by changes in oil rents greatly
dampens aggregate demand volatility. With such large oil intensities,
a SSR and CCR lead to larger deﬁcit and debt ﬂuctuations. In contrast,
for a supply driven oil price movement, the optimal response remains
similar for the wide range of oil intensities. Here, once oil revenues are
removed from the economy, the problem is primarily the inﬂation var-
iability. Responding to the remaining inﬂation variation would result in
additional output loss.
3.2.3. Foreign ownership of oil
In an economy with a share of foreign ownership of oil (ceteris
paribus), a smaller share of rents is collected domestically by the ﬁscal
authority. Table 5 shows the optimized ﬁscal rules when the SOE has a
50% foreign claim on oil rents. This calibration is consistent with coun-
tries that employ joint ownership with foreign companies forTable 4
Two year multiplier of ﬁscal instruments.a
Real GDP Headline inﬂation
Public absorption 0.53 0.28
Public investment 0.64 0.34
General transfers 0.14 0.23
Targeted transfers 0.32 0.50
Labor taxes 0.25 0.22
a The two year ﬁscal multiplier is deﬁned by the two year average of the percent devi-
ation from steady state increase in real GDP over the two year average of the difference of
the overall ﬁscal balance to GDP ratio from steady state.production such as Botswana and Papua New Guinea. In this case, the
ﬁscal response is slightly smaller relative to the case without foreign
ownership as less oil rents are absorbed domestically by both public
and private agents.
3.2.4. Composition of the non-oil tax revenues
The source of non-oil tax revenues and its share in total revenues
may affect the operation of the ﬁscal rule by changing the response of
the non-oil tax-revenue gap to business cycles. The non-oil tax-
revenue gap serves as a good proxy to income and output ﬂuctuations,
because tax revenues adjust with their underlying tax bases: consump-
tion, labor, and capital. However, non-oil revenue is lower in countries
that have sizable informal labor markets or small non-oil tax revenues,
which raises skepticism of the use of such rules in these economies. The
analysis suggests that a low level of labor tax revenue in total revenues
does not pose a limitation to the use of a tax-revenue gap-based rule,
because the path of the tax bases will still follow a similar path, even
though their magnitudes and relative compositions change. In such a
case, the size of the coefﬁcients on the tax-revenue gaps is justmodiﬁed
to compensate for the reduced volatility of the tax-revenue gaps.
3.3. Monetary policy considerations
This section considers the role of monetary policy for the design of
the preferred ﬁscal rule. In particular, three cases are considered:
(i) whenmonetary policy optimizes headline or core inﬂation targeting,
(ii) when ﬁscal and monetary policies are jointly optimized, and (iii)
when monetary policy employs a ﬁxed exchange regime. The results
are presented in Table 6.
3.3.1. Optimal monetary policy: core versus headline targets
The analysis thus far has assumed that the monetary authority re-
sponds to the deviation of core inﬂation from the target level. For supply
driven oil price movements, there is little improvement in macroeco-
nomic volatility from themonetary authority adopting an optimalmon-
etary policy rule that targets core inﬂation. This is because core inﬂation
quickly falls from the decline in demand for non-oil goods. In contrast,
optimal targeting of core inﬂation in the presence of a demand shock
can lead to large gains due to the complementarities of rising core inﬂa-
tion and a positive output gap. For supply driven oil price movements,
when the monetary authority targets headline inﬂation, output can
quickly falls due to the small response of the non-oil economy.
Currently, the targeting of core inﬂation is understood to be the best
operational practice when monetary policy faces relative oil-price
movements, see Hogan et al. (2001), and Natal (2012). This is due to
the inability of the macro authority to inﬂuence the global price of oil,
the lag at which policy impacts inﬂation, and the relatively fast reversal
of temporary oil pricemovements. However, this analysis suggests that,
for broad-based demand driven oil price movements, it is desirable to
respond to headline-pricemovements given the objective of macroeco-
nomic stability. This further highlights the need for a global model to
Table 5
Optimal Fiscal Rules by Structural Characteristic of the SOE.
doil dtax Optimal less SSR / GDPa Loss function SSR Loss function optimal
Temporary reduction in oil supply
Private ownership of oil production 103 5 × 103 −0.31 0.064 0.049
Low dependence of oil in exports 103 5 × 103 −0.36 0.072 0.049
High dependence of oil in exports 105 107 −0.39 0.111 0.041
Foreign share in oil ownership 102 5 × 103 −0.21 0.059 0.049
Low level of labor taxes in revenue 105 108 −0.35 0.071 0.040
No direct consumption of oil 1 5 × 103 −0.22 0.028 0.006
Temporary increase in oil demand
Private ownership of oil production 0 102 −0.76 0.119 0.096
Low dependence of oil in exports 0 102 −0.87 0.128 0.086
High dependence of oil in exports 105 107 −0.23 0.147 0.072
Foreign share in oil ownership 1 10 −0.63 0.125 0.097
Low level of labor taxes in revenue 1 108 −0.76 0.126 0.079
No direct consumption of oil 102 5 × 103 −0.76 0.109 0.061
a Measures the difference of the overall ﬁscal balance between the optimal ﬁscal policy rule and the SSR as a percent of GDP.
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optimal policy to oil price ﬂuctuations.
3.3.2. Jointly optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
Under an optimal core inﬂation targeting regime,moving to a jointly
optimal monetary and ﬁscal regime can reduce macroeconomic varia-
tion by an additional 40% and 15% for a supply shock and demand
shock to the price of oil, respectively. Under an optimal headline inﬂa-
tion targeting regime, moving to a jointly optimal monetary and ﬁscal
regime can reduce macroeconomic variation by an additional 32% and
6% for a supply shock and demand shock to the price of oil, respectively.
This suggests that, even under optimalmonetary policy, adopting anop-
timal ﬁscal rule can produce large reductions in macroeconomic
volatility.
When both ﬁscal and monetary regimes are jointly optimized, both
headline and core inﬂation targeting can roughly achieve the same de-
gree of macroeconomic stabilization. This suggests that the choice of
the operational target of monetary policy does not pose a limitation to
the adoption of the optimal ﬁscal rule.
3.3.3. Fixed exchange rate regimes
This section examines optimal ﬁscal rules when the SOE operates a
ﬁxed nominal exchange rate with the ROW. This is true for many
African countries who are participating in currency unions. In fact, a
ﬁxed exchange rate regime is one circumstance that Taylor (2000) pro-
poses when discretionary ﬁscal policy can enhancemacroeconomic sta-
bility. Further, it is well documented that the preoccupation of
monetary policy with its ﬁxed exchange rate induces moreTable 6
Jointly optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy rules.
doil dtax d⁎a
Temporary reduction in oil supply
Inﬂation targeting (baseline) 102 5 × 103 –
Fixed exchange rate 103 5 × 103 –
Joint core IT and tax gaps 103 5 × 104 10
Structural surplus rule 1 1 2.4 × 103
Joint headline IT and tax gaps 103 5 × 104 3
Structural surplus rule 1 1 9.5
Temporary increase in oil demand
Inﬂation targeting (baseline) −104 106 –
Fixed exchange rate 1 10 –
Joint core monetary and tax gaps 103 106 3
Structural surplus rule 1 1 55
Joint headline IT and tax gaps 103 105 3
Structural surplus rule 1 1 16
a Other optimized coefﬁcients: dπ for core inﬂation targeting, dΠ for headline inﬂation targe
b This measure is the difference of the overall deﬁcit between the efﬁcient ﬁscal policy rulemacroeconomic volatility than under an inﬂation-targeting regime
(see for example Adler and Sosa, 2014; Broda, 2004; and Raﬁq, 2011).
For a SOE with a ﬁxed exchange rate, a move to a CCR results in the
largest reduction in volatility relative to the BBR and SSR. This is primar-
ily due to the shear volatility of the SOEwith a ﬁxed exchange rate. For a
supply shock to the price of oil, an optimal ﬁscal rule can roughly
achieve the same degree of macroeconomic volatility under both a
ﬁxed exchange rate and optimal inﬂation targeting regime. In contrast,
for a demand shock to the price of oil, ﬁscal policy runs counter tomon-
etary policy and macroeconomic volatility is three times higher under
the optimal ﬁscal rule compared to an optimized inﬂation targeting
regime.
4. Conclusions
This paper evaluates the optimal design of formalized ﬁscal policy
rules for stabilizing macroeconomic volatility and welfare over oil-
price cycles for oil-exporting economies. A budget-balance tax-gap
rule that responds to both the oil-royalties and non-oil tax revenues
gap is found to be more desirable than other ﬁscal rules that target the
non-oil structural balance, debt-gap, and output gap. For a small open
economy, oil price ﬂuctuations mainly affect the economy through
changes in the terms of trade. Hence, the desired degree of
countercyclicality is increasing in the importance placed on output vol-
atility relative to consumption volatility.
A larger countercyclical ﬁscal response is found desirable for exter-
nal demand-driven relative to external supply-driven oil price move-
ments due to their effect on the non-oil economy. In particular, oil
exporters face the additional challenge of headline inﬂation volatilityOptimal less SSR / GDPb Loss function SSR Loss function efﬁcient
−0.51 0.080 0.045
−2.66 0.089 0.044
−0.54 0.080 0.044
0.02 0.080 0.076
−0.12 0.074 0.041
0.08 0.074 0.065
−0.59 0.127 0.078
−0.95 0.261 0.202
−0.47 0.127 0.069
0.10 0.127 0.089
−0.25 0.127 0.069
0.2 0.133 0.078
ting.
and the SSR as a percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year proceeding the shock.
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consumption basket. As oil in consumption has not been modeled in
many studies, it suggests that this channel is an important avenue for
further study as it may have important implications for ﬁscal policy in
oil-importing economies (Zhang and Chen, 2012), and for model stabil-
ity (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 1997; Guo and Lansing, 1998;
Aguiar-Conraria and Wen, 2008, 2012).
The optimal ﬁscal rule closely resembles targeting the non-oil struc-
tural balance and allowing for automatic countercyclical stabilizers.
Budget-balance tax-gap rule are desirable for all types of oil-exporters
from specialist such as OPEC economies to diversiﬁed advanced econo-
mies such as Norway, Canada, or Australia. This result is robust to sever-
al instruments satisfying the rule, excluding those that impact potential
output such as government investment and capital taxes.
Joint coordination of countercyclical monetary and ﬁscal policy cre-
ates more ﬂexibility for the authorities to reduce inﬂation and output
variability. Even in the presence of an optimal monetary policy,
adopting an optimal ﬁscal rule can produce large reductions in macro-
economic volatility. Large gains are particularly observed for supply
driven oil price movements since monetary policy is quick to face an
output-inﬂation trade-off. When jointly optimized with ﬁscal policy
rules, both headline and core inﬂation targeting can achieve the same
degree of macroeconomic stabilization.
The gains from moving to an optimal ﬁscal rule are largest under
ﬁxed exchanges rate policy. An optimal ﬁscal rule with a ﬁxed ex-
changes rate policy can achieve the same degree ofmacroeconomic vol-
atility as an optimal inﬂation targeting regime for supply driven oil price
movements. In contrast, for demand driven oil price movements, mac-
roeconomic volatility is three times higher under the optimal ﬁscal
rule and ﬁxed-exchange rate policy compared to an optimized ﬁscal
and inﬂation targeting regime.
In general, oil exporters have been moving in the right direction.
Some are already operating effectively under a structural ﬁscal rule or
are in the process of formalizing ﬁscal institutions. The results suggest
that large gains towelfare andmacroeconomic stabilization are possible
when the ﬁscal authority makes even partial effort towards the optimal
ﬁscal policy. Oil exporters, despite their many differences, await further
and large gains from formalized ﬁscal policy frameworks.
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